As many have already noted, the serious crisis paralyzing the wholesale credit markets is less a crisis of liquidity a retention of the cash crisis. Somehow, it is not less serious because, if an objective shortage of liquidity can still be filled by a Central Bank decided to do so, convince the agents to their traffic is another story. This is what makes the crisis this elusive evidenced by failure apparent just voted Paulson plan, unless it is known there recognize equivalent to finance one of those situations that the monetary history already presented, situations of monetary collapse seemingly unrecoverable, but yet resolved with extreme rapidity! André Orléan, which has developed them more deeply, speaks of "monetary"miracle about of these narcotics outcomes, including the passage to the 1923 rentenmark and the franc Poincaré 1928 provide spectacular examples.
If this monetary reference is worth to be mentioned about the financial today embolism, because all of these situations have formally stand as the inability to remove officers of the "vicious" expectations equilibrium in which they were tilted and where, in this case, uncertainty of each on the status of the other leads to refusal to lend resulting in the deterioration of the situation of otheretc. The "miracle" is in the occurrence of an "event", which may be the fact that of the public, external power to the game of collectively blocked private agents, event capable of reversing all expectations and recoordonner agents to autoréalisateur balance, as the previous but virtuous! where each agreeing to contribute to the relaxation of the situation, then providing reasons to lend more, etc.

What can this event today He must wonder about the disturbing inability of Paulson's plan to unfreeze markets for credit despite the enormity of its commitments. But it is that the volume is not all to the case and that there are many ways of spending $ 700 billion! Playing the leverage effects, the recapitalisation would have been more effective. But less than the alternative of going back to the real origins of the problem, namely real estate overindebtedness of households. Save households to save banks could then have multiple benefits. First to smooth out the financial burden in time, since instead of firm taking a shot of the mass of devalued assets recovery of households in their creditworthy borrower status through a repayment assistance of the State distributes the competition to bring through nominal timelines, is 20 years. Then because restoring the continuity of payment flows on all of the mortgage debts, this public contest restores ipso facto the full value of the ABS and CDOS that have been derived by securitization, instantly erasing losses and reconstituting the bases of equity, thus recreating the conditions for the resumption of the inter-bank credit. Finally, because redevenus household creditworthy borrowers revert at the same time occupiers of their homes, for those of us at whose House not yet was sold others may indeed be re-integrated in the property through construction programmes which it is unnecessary to emphasize the effect of stimulus.
By there in any case, public breaks the shameful asymmetry of the "too big to fail" and the "too small to lease", and won an unquestionable political legitimacy, that which has both failed during its first passage in the House. This last element economic perspective will spontaneously to perfectly peripheral is indeed of primary importance. As the essence of the "miracle" is to hit the spirits to reverse and recoordonner expectations private, the spectacle of the national community gathered behind the rescue plan adds significantly to its objective properties. We judge the degree to which Paulson's plan in its current state is doomed compared to a poor efficiency...
Indeed, it was twice deficit from the perspective of political legitimacy. As the remains, albeit at a much lower degree, the plan "lease-out" of the household. Because the latter, he also remains in the logic of the emergency plan and, as, lack of essential extension. The name can be given to the latter is well known: conditionality. That should save finance, except that it engulfs us all with it, it is one thing. But that this was done without the stronger counterparts, it would be strictly intolerable. Also, the real crisis plan immediately adds to parade of extreme emergency final boarding of liberalized financial scheme. Because only the project firmly said to prevent ever these agents interfere again may ultimately justify fully that it come to their rescue.